12. Turbulent Aftermath of 9/11/2001 Begins
In the depth of winter, I finally learned that there
was in me an invincible summer.
—Albert Camus
I turned the TV on as soon as I got home, since it was more than 20 hours prior that I had seen the TV news at Newark. It was very upsetting to see CNN repeatedly and exhaustively showing the airplanes striking the Twin Towers. Wouldn’t this also make many people afraid to get on another airplane? I called the Atlanta-based CNN and spoke to the producer. I pointed out that the whole world already knows of this tragedy. Showing those horrible scenes over and over would drive more people away from ever using an airplane again. My pleading was in vain.
No flights were scheduled for a week. Like many others, I was glued to the TV watching the news. I periodically called my crew desk to determine when flights would resume and I would be given my next assignment. Limited flights started after several days. My crew desk called to let me know that I would be taking the second flight from Newark to London. I would be deadheading from Atlanta to Chicago to Newark. I expected a call from flight management or the union with advice on how to deal with fearful crew members and passengers, but no calls arrived. We were apparently expected to “wing” it.
I met with my two copilots in Newark. We checked the weather, the load manifest, and filed our flight plan. I headed over to the inflight area by myself to meet with the flight attendants preflight briefing as I normally do. They were sobbing and hugging each other. United Flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania had flight attendants from Newark. Most of the departed were friends with my crew. It was a very heart-wrenching emotional sight to experience.
I assured the flight attendants that I would never leave the gate if any of them felt that there was a security concern with the airplane before departing. I would also return to the gate if a concern arose after I left the gate. I would land at the nearest suitable airport and declare an emergency if a security concern occurred in flight. My assurances provided a little relief for the already frightened cabin crew.
United Airlines had a policy that if any aircrew member felt threatened or afraid by security concerns, they could remain on the ground with full pay for the trip. I was to discover that this policy was being abused. If any flight attendant or crew member wanted to stay on the ground because of security concerns, they would now be ordered by management to take the flight or be terminated!
Fortunately, our first flight to London and back after 9/11 didn’t have any security concerns or any other troubling events.
Within two days of the 9/11 catastrophe, it was reported that 19 angry private pilot Muslims had commandeered the flights with box cutters and crashed the four airplanes. This unbelievable story was to be repeated for years without providing any serious supporting evidence. This story was ludicrous for me. I remembered how wet behind the ears I was as a top-student private pilot with only 40 hours of flying. I knew that it was not possible for these inexperienced private pilots to have flown the complex and highly sophisticated Boeing airplanes. They couldn’t have flown at the recorded altitudes and done the difficult flight maneuvers that are only possible for highly-experienced pilots. The flight path into the Pentagon was especially troublesome, since we will later demonstrate that not even the best pilots could have flown that approach. Could it be that no pilots were in the Pentagon crash?
It was obvious to me that there were, and still are, large gaping holes in the commercial aviation safety system. I started sharing these concerns with my immediate supervisors in management and in my union and the chief pilot and the union council chairman. I began reporting specific examples with suggestions on how to fix them. I used personal conversations, phone calls, and emails. Unfortunately, I sensed that all of my observations and concerns were being ignored or stonewalled.
President George Bush appeared on national TV between American Airlines and United Airlines B-767 airplanes. He claimed that the commercial airline industry was secure. He encouraged people to fly to Disney World and have a good time. I knew better. He was either lying or 9/11 didn’t go down as we were being told.
Passenger load factors had now plummeted. Jet fuel prices were skyrocketing. Rumors of filing Chapter 11 bankruptcies by United Airlines and other carriers were rampant. I started imagining that United Airlines might be liquidated, as we had already seen with TWA, Pan Am, Eastern Airlines, and others. That result could put me out on the street and unemployed once again. That frightened me, especially since I was getting close to retirement.
United Airlines did file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy shortly thereafter. The bankruptcy judge immediately granted United Airlines a 40% cut in salaries for all employees as financial relief. Since the unions were already on the financial ropes, they were unable to successfully fight this pay cut in the courts. The unions also continued to ignore the security and safety concerns that I had reported.
Trouble reared its ugly head one morning, just fifteen minutes before departure at London’s Heathrow Airport. The purser chief flight attendant entered the cockpit. A male passenger at the back of coach had run the entire length of the aisle screaming that there was a bomb on board. He was now standing with a security agent in the jetway. Most of the passengers were now very nervous and wanted to deplane. I went to the jetway and observed a short nervous man trembling with fear and started questioning him. I also asked the agent to get paramedics and the head of United Airlines Heathrow security to the plane entrance right away.
While still talking with the man, flight attendants motioned to me that passengers were grabbing their belongings and getting ready to deplane. I re-entered the airplane and used the public address phone to advise all passengers to take their belongings and deplane. The disruptive passenger would not be going with us. The airplane was going to be re-inspected by ground personnel. I explained that safety and security were the number one concerns of United Airlines. Passengers thanked me that I was concerned for their welfare as they deplaned.
Some of the flight crews were also fearful and were contemplating not working on that flight because of security concerns.
As passengers were deplaning, two flight attendant supervisors boarded the airplane. They demanded to know the names of the flight attendants who were delaying the flight. I tried to explain that the flight attendants had followed excellent Command, Leadership, and Resource Management (CLR) procedures by informing me of the disruptive passenger. If I hadn’t been informed, I might have had to abort the flight over the Atlantic. What if there actually was a bomb on board that would detonate when we were over the Atlantic? Both outcomes would be expensive and disastrous for United Airlines. I also pointed out that some flight attendants wanted to deplane because of fear. The response of the supervisors was that they would give direct orders to all crew to take the flight. They would be terminated if they refused!
The cockpit never received the cabin video monitoring systems we were promised after 9/11. These supervisors didn’t seem to care when I explained that the flight attendants were my eyes and ears for monitoring passenger activity that could be disruptive and require the captain to take decisive action. They disregarded my concerns. An hour later we departed with all flight attendants onboard. Only a few passengers decided not to take the flight from London to Newark.
I submitted my Captain’s Report when back in Newark. I was outraged to discover that company policy was in direct contradiction to CLR best practices. This could result in disasters, including loss of lives and airplanes. Since I didn’t receive any response, I contacted my Chief Pilot to explain the situation. He claimed that he couldn’t support me. I now realized beyond any shadow of doubt that all of my reporting was being stonewalled by both the company and my union. This could only mean that airline safety and security was taking a back seat to the company’s bottom line finances. The union was powerless to protect the flying pilots. United Airlines was in bankruptcy.
Israel’s El Al national flag carrier is the only airline in the world that has defensive systems in place. These systems are designed to thwart an in-flight attack from ground by shoulder-launched surface-to-air heat-seeking missiles. These threats have brought down airplanes and still exist today for all airlines. I was ignored when trying to bring these issues to light. Although defensive technology did exist, it was not being used by anyone except Israel.
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 took off from London’s Heathrow Airport, bound for New York City. Among the 259 passengers and crew were 190 Americans. They never made it home. Less than 40 minutes into the flight, the plane exploded over the sky above Lockerbie, Scotland, killing everyone on board and 11 Scots on the ground. The investigation finally determined that the bombers had checked their luggage in Frankfurt through London and to New York City. They deplaned in London and never reboarded.
After the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster, the “positive bag match” procedure was implemented. If a passenger checked his luggage and then did not board the airplane, his luggage would be removed from the cargo bay, even if it meant delaying the flight to recover the luggage. This process was implemented only on U.S. flights from abroad to the United States. It was not implemented on domestic flights. My Captain’s Report was ignored when I described these security issues. I suspected that it was not financially feasible for United Airlines to implement this procedure on domestic flights because of possible flight delays and revenue loss.
In 2003, 90% of the cargo loaded into the belly of the airplane was not being inspected for explosives. This information was ignored in my Captain’s Report. I don’t know the current status of testing cargo for explosives as we write this book.
Between 9/11/2001 and the Spring of 2003, I had submitted many other reports about troubling safety issues. They all appeared to be stonewalled. Yet safety had been ingrained in my aviation soul from my first student training flight with Ed Shafer at the Downtown Airpark. Safety and situational awareness were also drilled into me as a Naval pilot. Until recently, safety always seemed important with United Airlines. It now appeared that the union had been forced to go along with United Airlines management for their own survival because of the bankruptcy.
In desperation, I finally wrote a business letter to the United Airlines Senior Vice President of Safety in Chicago. I laid out my concerns about safety and security issues and told him I felt that I had been stonewalled by either the company or the union. My chief pilot called me a few days later to say that the VP of Safety had told him, “You tell that fucking son of a bitch that if he thinks he can do a better job than me, then effective Monday morning, he can be the new Vice President of Safety for United Airlines.” I was flabbergasted!
I received an unsolicited phone call in April of 2003 from a union management captain in Chicago. He expressed concern for my career by saying, “They think that you are a big mouthed, loose cannon whistleblower and would like you to just go away.” He added, “Come on Dan, be a team player. We’re in bankruptcy and we need to cooperate with the company.” I replied in no uncertain terms that Chapter 11 bankruptcy doesn’t trump commercial aviation safety and security. I would not compromise human lives to save the company’s bottom line from possible liquidation.
The first sentence in the ALPA Code of Ethics stated that the safety of passengers was our foremost concern. I then wrote a formal business letter to ALPA Master Executive Council Chairman Captain Paul Whiteford in Chicago. I copied key individuals in management and the union. I again expressed concerns over the degradation of safety and security since 9/11. I also was concerned about the stonewalling of my federal reports that seemed to be taking place.
I received another call a few days later from my New York ALPA Council Chairman Captain Mark Seal to advise me that I was stepping on some big toes. “Watch it, Dan… these guys are nasty!” He wouldn’t tell me who “these guys” were. Another well-respected individual who was then ALPA Professional Standards Chairman cautioned me. “If you take it to the top, Dan, you’re going to get hurt.” All of these remarks concerned me. It was beginning to look like my good friends and peers were more concerned about surviving their airline careers than aviation safety and security issues.
I wasn’t going to be intimidated. Behind the scenes many of my union pilot friends were encouraging me to continue reporting about safety and security issues. I was considering taking these issues to the top. I still believed that the union would protect me.
Standing up for what is right as a pilot can take courage. Courage is “feeling fear, yet carrying out your mission anyway.” Because of the responses I was receiving and not receiving, I was fearful about what I was saying and doing. Yet I felt obliged as a professional pilot with integrity to press on. This was not just about me. I was deeply concerned about the safety and security of my flight crew and the passengers. I prayed a lot for guidance and the courage to do what was morally correct as a professional airline Captain. I finally decided to take it all the way to the top.